Abstract-The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty allows for Multi-Spectral and Infrared Imaging from an aircraft and on the ground to help reduce the search area for an underground nuclear explosion from the initial 1,000 km 2 . Satellite data, primarily from Landsat, have been used as a surrogate for aircraft data to investigate whether there are any multi-spectral features associated with the nuclear tests in Pakistan, India or North Korea. It is shown that there are multi-spectral observables on the ground that can be associated with the nominal surface ground zero for at least some of these explosions, and that these are likely to be found by measurements allowed by the treaty.
Introduction
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) permits Multi-Spectral and InfraRed Imaging (MSIR) to be performed as part of an On-Site Inspection (OSI) for the purpose of reducing the search area for the location of a possible underground nuclear explosion (UNE). Dedicated airborne MSIR measurements were not made in conjunction with historical or recent UNE's, so satellite data has been used to determine if there are MSIR observables associated with recent UNE's. In this work, MSIR data from commercial satellites has been used to show that there are detectable surface observables which can be used to greatly reduce the search area for the location of the UNE. This has been demonstrated using Landsat data of the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean UNE's in the last 12 years, and with GeoEye-1 data for the North Korean tests. The techniques used typically identify a region of interest less than 1 km 2 in size (compared to the nominal 1,000 km 2 search area), and the few false positives have been resolvable as such by using visible imagery.
The results of this study show that MSIR data from satellites can be used to help prepare the inspection team for an OSI. The Landsat data used here were chosen for their ready availability, the expectation that the satellite spatial resolution and spectral bands would be useful, and the 16-day site revisit time of the satellite. Data from other satellites may have greater utility-for one site, GeoEye data with 3 m spatial resolution were used to find regions that were not detected in the 30 m spatial resolution Landsat data. The analysis techniques used here are fairly straightforward change detection or surface categorization techniques and a more sophisticated spatial/spectral algorithm that uses both properties to find anomalous regions in a data set. Improvements in sensitivity and reduction of false alarms are expected with the development of more sophisticated techniques.
The GeoEye data show that more sensitive detection of regions of interest is possible with higher spatial resolution, although that data suffers from a minimal set (4) of spectral channels. Additionally, this work has shown that automated algorithms are particularly useful in sifting through large data volumes and detecting specific types of anomalies that are not readily apparent to visual inspection of the data.
The results here provide confidence that airborne MSIR data will be useful for an On-Site Inspection under the CTBT.
Background and Purpose
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) allows for Multi-Spectral and Infrared Imaging (MSIR) measurements as part of an On-Site Inspection (OSI) (CTBT 1996) . The objective of MSIR measurements is to help narrow the search area for the location of a potential nuclear explosion that violates the CTBT. The application and utility of MSIR measurements for OSI require further study: MSIR measurements have only recently been made (September 2011 and May 2012) at field exercises conducted by the CTBT Organization; there are no vetted requirements for the specification of equipment that might be used for MSIR; and the current level of experience is insufficient to generate a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or analysis procedures for the use of MSIR to support an OSI.
In general, the UNE observables that might be detected by MSIR fall into five categories (HENDER-SON 2010):
1. disturbed earth at the surface (due to the shock wave from the explosion), 2. plant stress in the vicinity of the UNE, 3. artifacts of human activity, 4. thermal effects, and 5. novel materials at the surface.
The first has not been explicitly measured for a UNE, but visible observations of earth movement, surface fissures, and measurements of surface upheaval from prior UNE's indicate that disturbed earth is possible for a UNE of sufficient size (EISLER and CHILTON 1964) . Further, measurements for other purposes have shown that disturbed earth can be detected with MSIR imaging (ROCKETT 1999) .
Airborne MSIR measurements of plant stress were made during the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), so this observable has been demonstrated under relevant conditions. The amount of plant stress was observed to peak one to two days after the explosion, and then fade back to pre-explosion levels after about a week (PICKLES 1995) .
Observables associated with activities in support of a UNE are expected to vary with the specific conditions of executing the UNE, but MSIR measurements are often able to detect activities such as recent traffic on dirt and gravel roads, as well as thermal indications of activity in buildings. Temperature related observables lie in the long-wave infrared, while road traffic and disturbed earth can have observables in the visible and infrared spectral regions (ROCKETT 1999) .
Thermal effects at the surface might be due to either hot gases from the UNE blast escaping to the surface, or underground water flows being redirected to the surface by changed sub-surface geology. Novel materials could be brought to the surface through either venting of materials from the UNE, or by migration of native sub-surface material to the surface because of the escape of hot gases or water (HALL et al. 1997) .
Maturing the use of MSIR for an OSI requires that the MSIR observables of an UNE be well characterized so the MSIR equipment, deployment CONOPS, and data analysis techniques can be specified. Given the absence of relevant airborne data (except for plant stress), satellite data was used to determine whether MSIR observables are reliably associated with a UNE, and to characterize those observables. Since MSIR instruments on satellites have improved significantly over time, this work focused on UNE's conducted in the last 14 years.
There is an extensive body of prior work on using satellite measurements for treaty monitoring. Much of this work focuses on using satellite imagery to detect activities prior to a nuclear test (JASANI 1995; , or the use of satellite imagery and data to localize a nuclear test after the detection of a seismic signal (CANTY and SCHLITTENHARDT 2001b) .
Additionally, there is a growing body of work on the use of satellite SAR data to detect surface movement induced by the underground explosion (CONG et al. 2007; VINCENT et al. 2003 VINCENT et al. , 2011 .
A 2010 paper by SCHLITTENHARDT et al. (2010) provides an excellent description of the use of change detection algorithms with satellite data, as well as a good summary of satellites of interest. There are a number of additional papers on analysis methods and change detection techniques for this application CANTY et al. 2001a; CANTY and NIELSEN 2006; NUSSBAUM et al. 2005) .
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that (1) there are MSIR observables associated with UNE's, and (2) those observables have unique spectral/spatial properties which can be exploited with a basic set of analysis tools to greatly reduce the search area for purposes of an OSI. The methodology in this paper distinguishes it from previous work because we have used the satellite data as surrogate data for the expected aerial MSIR data that might be acquired during an OSI, and have chosen to use a subset of the satellite data to represent the 1,000 km 2 inspection area roughly centered on the seismic center, as prescribed by the CTBT. The results here are expected to be directly applicable to what inspectors in an OSI would obtain, and the emphasis is on the use of the multi-spectral capabilities, since visual observations are a mature technology for use in an OSI. A key aspect of this paper, which we have not seen specifically addressed elsewhere, is the question of false positives (a positive finding at a location other than the site of the UNE). Since any information which reduces the search area down from 1,000 km 2 is useful, techniques which generate false positives are acceptable, as long as they find the area of interest and do not generate too many false positives.
Selection of Data
The six UNE's in the last 12 years were chosen as the focus of this study because they represent the size of UNE (approximately one kiloton of yield) of concern to the CTBT, and because they are recent enough that a variety of potentially relevant satellite measurements exist. While Landsat 5 (whose Thematic Mapper data was used here) was launched in 1984 (well before the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992), satellites with higher spatial resolution and better spectral capabilities have launched more recently. The Landsat data was used because the data is readily downloadable; it has relevant spectral bins, including a standard plant stress data product; the spatial resolution is acceptable (30 m versus an expected feature size of over 150 m for disturbed earth or plant stress), the data volumes are manageable, and the frequency of observation is acceptable for the disturbed earth measurements. The Landsat data also allow us to extract a 900 km 2 region (30 km 9 30 km sub-image) from a single data set, which avoids having to stitch together two satellite data sets for our desired processing. SCHLITTENHARDT et al. (2010) needed to merge two ASTER data sets to cover the region of interest since the ASTER swath width is only 60 km and the center did not pass the center of the region of interest. Similar concerns would apply to SPOT imagery (60 km swath width). Google Earth imagery, and higher spatial resolution data from additional satellites were used to understand the context of results obtained from the Landsat data.
The six UNE's are, in order of ease of detection of MSIR observables, (not chronological order): 
UNE Detection Algorithms
The techniques used here for detecting observables associated with a UNE fall into three categories. The first is change detection, the second is surface categorization, and the third uses the spatial and spectral properties of the data to search for anomalies. In change detection, reference data is used from before (or after) the seismic event to establish the level and variability in each spectral channel for each pixel in the scene. The post-event data is then compared to the pre-event baseline to determine if any statistically significant changes have occurred for any pixels. These regions are flagged (by their spatial location and statistical significance) for consideration as candidate locations for the UNE.
The second technique is to use the spectral properties of a scene to group pixels into a few categories, where the pixels in each category have a similar spectral shape. Categories typically correspond to scene features such as soil, rock, vegetation or shadows. The pre-event and post-event categories are compared spatially, and any differences evaluated. For example, a region that showed as vegetative pre-event and then shows as soil post-event would be a candidate for the UNE location since surface disruption might overturn vegetation and expose bare ground. An advantage of this technique is that it does not require the use of pre-event data, although it is probably more sensitive when pre-event data is available. For example, a region that shows up as soil might be a candidate for proximity to the UNE if it can be distinguished from roads or farms by its size, shape, location or spectral difference from adjoining regions. The first and second techniques are based on known techniques (MALPICA and ALONSO 2008; REED and YU 1990) .
The third technique is similar to the scene categorization algorithm, except that the spatial properties of the scene are incorporated. For example, regions of a scene that show as bare earth might be either dirt roads or farms. Each of those has distinct spatial properties. A region of disturbed earth may appear to have the spectral shape of bare earth, but will have different spatial characteristics and can therefore be identified as anomalous. This is useful because it can identify potential regions of interest in a complex scene that might be missed by visual inspection of the scene categories map (from the second method). This work draws on prior spectral-spatial algorithms (MITCHLEY et al. 2009; MYINT 2001; RIVARD et al. 2008; SRINIVAS and WU 2005; SUBOTIC et al. 1997; THOMAS 2008; THYAGARAJAN and PATTERSON 2010; VAN DER WERFF and LUCIEER 2006; ZHANG et al. 2005) .
It should be noted that application of these detection algorithms to specific sites is presently an iterative process. Detection thresholds need to be adjusted for the properties of the location being imaged to achieve consistent and robust results, and comparison of the results from the different algorithms was used to provide insight into interpretation of the results and refinement of the algorithms for this application. That new understanding is the basis for future work to develop more sensitive detection algorithms.
Analysis Process
For each UNE, published estimates of the location of the UNE were evaluated for a best estimate of the location of the UNE. The Landsat data nearest that location was downloaded for several data sets before and after the event, subject to data availability and the data being sufficiently cloud-free. A 30 km 9 30 km region around the best guess location was extracted from the data for primary analysis, intended to be similar to the 1,000 km 2 search region allowed by the CTBT.
6. Results
First Pakistani Test, 28 May 1998
The 28 May 1998 Pakistani nuclear test was chosen as a first case because there is an obvious surface change in the visible imagery, which is probably due to a rock slide proximate to the location of the UNE. In this case, since the visible imagery clearly indicates significant changes in the surface material, spectral analysis should produce similar results.
Landsat data were acquired for two dates before the event (26 April 1998 and 28 May 1998), and 13 dates after the event (13 June 1998 to 7 January 1999). Figure 1 shows Landsat data 1 month after the event which illustrates that the event location is obvious in visible imagery, although this single image is not sufficient to unambiguously identify those pixels as proximate to the UNE. Comparison to pre-event data, and inspection of detailed visible imagery (right image in Fig. 1) show that the bright region in the image was not present pre-event, and that the bright pixels are due to rock slides.
A subset of the data sets were used for change detection-one date before the event (28 May 1998), and 7 dates after the event (13 June 1998 -19 October 1998 . Some of the data were excluded because they included very thin clouds which would increase the apparent pixel variability and reduce the algorithm sensitivity. The most recent data sets were excluded because of concerns that weathering of the exposed material and human activities would also add unwanted changes to the reference data. (Spectral changes due to material weathering were observed using the material categorization algorithm, confirming the concerns here and illustrating the benefit of using and comparing several algorithms).
The change detection algorithm determined the statistical significance of change for each pixel (in a multivariate sense) between the one data set taken before the UNE and the larger set taken after the UNE. The spectra of the statistically significant pixels are shown in the left graph in Fig. 2 (the black spectra are from the UNE, all other colors are from other regions showing significant change), and the location of those pixels is shown in the right plot in Fig. 2 . Note that the graph of the spectra shows two distinct behaviors, which correspond to two physically separate regions on the ground. Inspection of the visible imagery suggests that the changed pixels in the upper left are due to farm activities, possibly tilling the ground or crop growth. The remaining region corresponds to the suspect region in the visible imagery.
The spectral categorization techniques were also applied to this data. Figure 3 shows the results of that analysis. Again, the exposed material from the UNE is readily apparent, and the ''false positive'' for the same material along the stream is readily distinguished as not relevant. Note that there are no other significant false positives. These results were obtained for each of the 13 post-event images that extend for 6 months after the event, indicating the spectral persistence of the observable and that no preevent data is needed to locate the observable. The ability to use only post-event data is directly relevant to an OSI where any MSIR aircraft data will only be collected after the event.
Here, we also looked at whether the spectrum of the different surface materials changed with time and found that they did for the exposed rock material over the 7-month period after the event. This indicates either that continued rock slides were exposing material with slightly different spectral properties than the original material, or that the exposed material was weathering and its spectral properties were changing over time. In either case, the variation with time of the spectral shape of this region also indicates a region of interest.
While these results are not surprising, given the obvious visible observable, they are important for three reasons. First, it demonstrates that the multispectral data and analysis techniques can find observables associated with a UNE. Second, the only ''false positives'' identified by the techniques were in fact regions one would want to investigate further since they represent disturbed earth (and were readily identified as false positives from the context of the visible imagery). Third, these techniques provide an automated means of sifting through millions of pixels, which is important if higher spatial resolution data is used, and is likely to be essential when rapid and objective data analysis is needed for an OSI.
Second Pakistani Test, 30 May 1998
The 30 May 1998 Pakistani nuclear test does not have an obvious feature in any visible imagery. Figure 4 shows the 30 km 9 30 km regions selected for analysis, along with two estimates of the UNE location, based on seismic analysis with differing assumptions. Two candidate locations for the UNE derived from analysis of the Landsat multispectral data are also shown in the figure for comparison. Thirteen sets of Landsat data were acquired and used in the analyses here, three pre-event (27 April 1990-19 May 1998) and 10 post-event (4 June 1998-8 May 2000). Again, only some of the Landsat data were used for the change detection algorithm (all Figure 2 Left spectral difference graph shows spectra of pixels identified as having changed significantly after the event. Note that there are two types of spectral behavior observed. Right the location of pixels with significant change (black dots) shows them to be in two spatially distinct regions. The spatial extent of the right image corresponds to the left image in Fig. 1 768 J. R. Henderson et al. Pure Appl. Geophys. three pre-event data sets and only the 4 June 1998 post-event data set). Figure 5 shows the results of the change detection algorithm. Note that the two candidate UNE locations are in a different location than either of the two locations suggested by the seismic data. This is a good demonstration of the limits of accuracy of the ability to geo-locate the UNE seismically for a low yield nuclear test, and of the ability of the multispectral data to reduce the search area. The two suspect areas are the regions in the image with the strongest change signal. The other areas in the image showing some significant amount of change are associated with geological features and are likely due to seasonal variations in solar illumination of the scene. Figure 6 shows the results of using the categorization algorithm to distinguish surface materials by their spectral properties. Here the algorithm has been enhanced to include a spatial filter to identify regions where their spatial scale distinguishes them from other parts of the scene with similar spectral properties. This enhances sensitivity and reduces the false positive rate. The results of this analysis are a single high-contrast spectral/spatial region detected for all data on and after 19 May 1998. This is before the test Figure 3 Results of using six spectral channels to classify the scene into three types of surface material: rock, soil and shadow. Upper left spectra of the three types of surface material. The other images are abundance maps for a 12 km 9 8.8 km central portion of the 30 km 9 30 km image, showing how similar each pixel on the ground is to one of the three material types. Note that the exposed rock map shows both the region exposed by rock slides from the UNE (red box) and material exposed by erosion and roads along the stream Vol. 171, (2014) Overhead Detection of Underground Nuclear Explosions 769 was executed, so the observable is probably due to human activity at that location. Note that this region matches the upper left (North East) suspect region identified from change detection, but that only a single data set of post-event data was used in its detection. The spatial/spectral analysis shows a marginally significant detection for some of the post-event data at the location of the lower right suspect area from the change detection analysis. It is interesting that two very different analysis techniques for the MSIR data give similar results for candidate areas for the nuclear test. It is also not surprising that the change detection technique appears to be more sensitive, but it is very encouraging that the spatial/ spectral technique can find the same regions using only post-event data.
First Indian Test, 11 May 1998
The 11 May 1998 Indian nuclear test does not have an obvious feature in visible imagery. Sixteen sets of Landsat data were acquired, three before the Figure 4 Landsat false color data for a 30 km 9 30 km region around the 30 May 1998 Pakistani nuclear test. The test location inferred from seismic data is shown for estimates with two different methods (WALLACE 1998; BARKER et al. 1998) . Two candidate locations for the test location derived from the MSIR data are shown by the thin arrows test (9 February 1998 -14 April 1998 and 13 after the test (16 May 1998 -21 May 2000 . Four of the data sets were used for change detection, three before the test (9 February 1998-14 April 1998) and one after the test (16 May 1998). Figure 7 shows the change detection image for the 30 km 9 30 km regions selected for analysis based on the best published information for the likely location. Figure 8 shows the region indicated by the change detection analysis superimposed on a current visible image. There is nothing to indicate any surface disturbance in the visible image, but there is about 10 years between the acquisition of the MSIR data and of the visible data. It is interesting to note that the indicated region lies adjacent to an area of obvious human activity. An earlier analysis (CANTY et al. 2001a) found the same hammer-like region using change detection on the 29 March 1998 and 16 May 1998 Landsat data, and identified the hammer-like region as the result of a brush fire by using commercial satellite imagery. While not necessarily related to a UNE, the technique was successful in identifying a region of interest through change detection. Spectral image categorization was performed on this data and indicated the same region as a region of interest.
Second Indian Test, 13 May 1998
The 13 May 1998 Indian nuclear test was of lower yield than the 11 May test, and public reporting by India indicated it was about 10 km away from the 11 May test. Here we use the same imagery as before, and lower the threshold for change detection and inspect the area about 10 km distant from the first test for candidate locations. Figure 9 shows that there are two candidate regions for inspection that fit the constraints. Since there is no corroborating information for these regions (no visible data, and the image categorization algorithm has not yet been run for these regions), they should be considered as they would for an actual OSI-regions of high interest for early inspection, but not necessarily a definitive location. The North Korean nuclear tests illustrate some of the limitations of using satellite data. There are frequently clouds in this region, so the Landsat data is often unavailable. For both of these tests, there were only seven Landsat data sets readily available, but there is a nearly 2-year gap with no data around 2008 due to weather and technical problems with the satellite. The data sets are from: • Some partially clouded Landsat data may also be available, but adapting the algorithms to account for clouds in some of the data was beyond the scope of this initial effort. It is important to note that the presence of clouds can introduce false positives (detections unrelated to the UNE) for the change detection algorithm, and false negatives (missed detections) for the spectral/spatial algorithm. Also, Landsat 7 data is available for some of this time, but there were problems with the scan mirror on that satellite (the data used here is from Landsat 5), which would have required additional work to attempt to correct for the pointing problems and would likely have resulted in artifacts in the change detection algorithms due to imperfections in pixel co-registration.
Because of the geography and significant plant cover in the region, the North Korean data has larger seasonal variability than the other data analyzed (see Fig. 10 ). This is manifested as varying amounts of snow on the ground, seasonal variations in the vegetation (due to natural variations, logging, and farming), and variations in the shadowing in the imagery due to the mountainous terrain combined with seasonal changes in solar illumination, which impacts pixel signal levels and surface material categorization in the images.
There are two paths that might prove fruitful for demonstrating MSIR utility for the North Korean tests. First, algorithms might be developed that can use partially cloudy data and account for the seasonal Figure 9 Change detection image for the 30 km 9 30 km sets of Landsat data for the 13 May 1998 Indian test (right). The detection threshold has been turned down to attempt to detect features from the lower yield test. The higher yield 11 May test feature is near the center of the data shown by the red dot. The circle indicates the publicly announced approximate separation between the 11 May test and the 13 May test. The two features in the red box are candidate locations for inspection for the 13 May test since they show significant change, they are within the stated range of the first test, and they do not correspond to false positives from geographical features Vol. 171, (2014) Overhead Detection of Underground Nuclear Explosions 773 effects observed. Second, other satellite data sources might be used, which would mitigate the data availability problem, and might provide inherently more useful data depending on the spatial and spectral resolution. We have started investigating this second path, as described in the next section.
GeoEye-1 North Korean Data
We acquired GeoEye-1 multi-spectral imagery of the North Korean test area with an acquisition date of 12 October 2009, about 5 months after the second North Korean nuclear test. This is relatively high spatial resolution (approximately 3 m) with a nearly 30 km swath width. (These are about twice the nominal satellite values of 1.6 m and 16 km swath width since this imagery was apparently acquired at a significant slant angle.) GeoEye-1 provides panchromatic imagery and 4-band multispectral imagery (blue, green, red, and near-infrared) with four times the pixel size as the panchromatic imagery. We ran the spatial/spectral algorithm to detect anomalies and identified several facilities of potential interest. While these anomalies are apparent from visual inspection of a color presentation of the imagery (subset shown in Fig. 10 ), the difficulty is that visual inspection results in hundreds of features of comparable apparent significance, often small buildings or clearings in the trees. The spatial/spectral algorithm reduces this number by a factor of 100 or more. Figure 10 shows Google imagery from February 2005 and GeoEye-1 multispectral imagery from October 2009. The first thing to note is how starkly different the two images are, even though they are both nominally true color images. The difference is that the February 2005 data is in winter with bare ground and bare trees. The October 2009 data still has vegetation present. These large seasonal differences make change detection very difficult with this location. The bright material is probably mining tailings, and is the spatial/spectral observable that caused this portion of the 30 km 9 30 km image to be flagged as a region of interest. It is important to note that this analysis of the GeoEye-1 data used only a single post-event data set to find anomalies, and that the spatial resolution is approaching that expected of airborne MSIR measurements, where sub-meter spatial resolution is readily achievable. Further, the spatial/spectral algorithm highlighted regions of interest automatically, so it was not necessary to evaluate the entire data set, only the regions-of-interest identified.
Discussion and Path Forward
These early results of the analysis of Landsat Thematic Mapper data show that MSIR observables can be detected from overhead measurements, and that they can be correlated with the likely location of an underground nuclear test. In some cases this is due to disturbed earth, and in other cases it appears human activities generated the observable. It is also very encouraging that two of the early algorithms used here do not require pre-event data, and hence are relevant to the OSI problem where aircraft data will only be acquired post-event. Also relevant is that the regions of interest are few in number and roughly 1 km 2 in size or smaller, which is a significant reduction from the nominal 1,000 km 2 initial search area. The Landsat data were only likely to find disturbed earth observables, and large-scale human activity observables because the 30 m pixel size is only likely to detect features on that scale or larger. While plant stress might be observed at spatial scales comparable to the disturbed earth observables, it may also require 0.5 m spatial resolution to separate the vegetation from the underlying ground materials. Similarly, many human artifacts would not be resolved with 30 m data. The GeoEye-1 data show that higher spatial resolution is useful for detecting human activities.
Despite these limitations, this work has shown that MSIR can find useful observables with several detection algorithms and a low false positive rate, and that the resulting regions of interest can be used in conjunction with high-resolution visible imagery to provide further discrimination between regions warranting further investigation and those unlikely to be relevant, such as farmlands. The fact that the change detection and the spatial/spectral algorithms identify the same regions using different techniques and different subsets of the data provides further confidence in these results.
The GeoEye-1 data show that higher spatial resolution is useful for detecting human activities. However, this data had only four spectral channels, and more spectral channels with higher spatial resolution may provide additional benefit for identifying regions of interest and eliminating false positives. We have started to look at sets of GeoEye-1 and other comparable satellite data (such as that from QuickBird) with the hope that the time series of data can be used to identify those features which are of highest interest, and that information can in turn be used to refine the search parameters so the high-interest regions can be more reliably identified from a single data set.
Finally, it is important to note that an important concern for the maturation of MSIR is to develop the requirements and deployment CONOPS for the MSIR instrumentation that might be flown as part of an OSI. The improvement in ability to identify regions of interest in going from 30 to 3 m spatial resolution is dramatic, despite the reduction of spectral channels from 6 to 4. This shows that it is likely that aircraft data will have significant utility for reducing the search area in an OSI, and that use of other data with higher spatial resolution and more and different spectral channels might go a long way toward developing the MSIR instrument requirements for an OSI. In the absence of a nuclear test where a post-event aircraft overflight with an MSIR instrument is allowed, a combination of satellite data on UNE's and other events (e.g., mining blasts or earthquakes) along with aircraft data on surrogate events or activities will have to be used to develop the MSIR instrument requirements.
